Missouri Law Review
Volume 68
Issue 2 Spring 2003

Article 5

Spring 2003

Stop in the Name of that Checkpoint: Sacrificing Our Fourth
Amendment Right in Order to Prevent Criminal Activity - State v.
Mack
Kathryn L. Howard

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kathryn L. Howard, Stop in the Name of that Checkpoint: Sacrificing Our Fourth Amendment Right in
Order to Prevent Criminal Activity - State v. Mack, 68 MO. L. REV. (2003)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss2/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Howard: Howard: Stop in the Name of that Checkpoint:

Stop in the Name of that Checkpoint:
Sacrificing Our Fourth Amendment Right in
Order to Prevent Criminal Activity
State v. Mack'

I. INTRODUCTION
With the recent escalation of terrorist attacks against the United States, the
prevention of crime in general has become a top priority for most Americans.
A question arises, however, as to what sacrifices to our personal liberties we
have to make to effectively prevent criminal activity? As indicated by the
Missouri Supreme Court's holding in State v. Mack,2 the answer may very well
be sacrificing our coveted Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.
The United States Supreme Court declared drug checkpoints illegal because
they were pursuing general crime control purposes,' but Mack seems to find a
way to circumvent that holding. The holding in Mack allows police to create
deceptive checkpoints to pursue general crime control purposes, something
which the United States Supreme Court has specifically prohibited. This Note
examines the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Mack, considers how the
majority came to its conclusion, and considers the policy implications of this
questionable decision.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING

At approximately 11:00 p.m. on June 24, 1999, Todd Mack was driving
northbound on Highway 61 in Lincoln County, Missouri, when he spotted signs
advertising a drug checkpoint one mile ahead. Mack pulled off at the nearest
exit, at Old Cap Au Gris road, which was only a quarter of a mile down the road,
admittedly to avoid the checkpoint.' Mack subsequently encountered uniformed

1. 66 S.W.3d 706 (Mo. 2002).
2. Id. at 710.
3. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (prohibits all drug
checkpoints, unless individualized suspicion exists as to each vehicle that is stopped and
searched).

4. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 707.
5. Id. at 707-08.
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police officers at a different, "ruse" drug checkpoint set up by the City of Troy
Police Department.6
In setting up the location of the checkpoint, the City of Troy Police
Department selected the exit at Old Cap Au Gris along Highway 61 because
there were few reasons to take the exit, except to avoid the advertised
checkpoint. 7 Signs were posted along the highway that led drivers to believe a
checkpoint was one exit further down the highway than it was actually located!
The police administered the checkpoint according to a written plan of action,
which called for uniformed officers stationed at the top of the ramp to stop all
exiting vehicles, record the driver's license and registration numbers, and
ascertain the occupants' reason for exiting.9 In addition, officers were to look
for any signs of possible drug trafficking and were given discretion to interview
any drivers and passengers they stopped.'
If, while administering the
checkpoint, circumstances raised reasonable suspicion, the officers then asked
the driver for permission to search the vehicle." If the driver of the vehicle
refused to grant permission, "officers used a drug dog to sniff the exterior of the
vehicle."' 2 If the dog indicated the presence of a controlled substance, the police
then searched the vehicle.'a
On the night in question, one of the officers at the scene stated that Mack
almost missed the turn on the exit and "all of a suddenly [sic] veered off onto the
off ramp."' 4 At the stop, officers observed that Mack "was very nervous, had
glazed and bloodshot eyes, and smelled of alcohol."' 5 The officers questioned
Mack's passenger and discovered the passenger was wanted for an outstanding
warrant."' Consequently, the police placed the passenger under arrest."
Thereafter, Mack gave the officers permission to search his vehicle.'" Officers

6. Id. at 707.
7. Id. The Old Cap Au Gris exit did not provide gas or food services to motorists.
Id. The onlyreason a motorist would take the exit would be to go to a local high school,

a Catholic church, or one of several residences. Id. Neither the high school nor the
church was holding any events on the night in question. Id.
8. Id. The signs stated "DRUG ENFORCEMENT CHECKPOINT ONE MILE
AHEAD" and "POLICE DRUG DOGS WORKING." Id.
9.Id.
10. Id.

11. Id. "If the driver granted permission, he or she was asked to sign a permission
to search form." Id. "[T]he officers then searched the vehicle." Id.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 708.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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subsequently found various narcotics and drug paraphernalia located under the
driver's seat of Mack's car. 9 Mack was later charged with three counts of
possession of a controlled substance, including methamphetamine, cocaine, and
methylphenidate, in violation of Section 195.202 of the Missouri Revised
Statutes.2"
On June 20, 2000, Mack filed a motion to suppress the evidence that was
obtained from the search of his vehicle at the ruse checkpoint.2 Mack argued
that the search and seizure were made without a warrant or other lawful authority
and without probable cause.22 Mack further argued that exigent circumstancesdid not exist so as to justify the search and seizure.23
The trial court denied Mack's motion to suppress the evidence, basing its
opinion on State v. Damask,24 in which the Missouri Supreme Court approved
a drug checkpoint similar to the one at issue.25 A short time after the trial court
made its ruling, however, the United States Supreme Court decided Indianapolis
v. Edmond,26 in which it declared drug checkpoints illegal. Specifically, the
Court in Edmond stated that evidence obtained through the use of drug
checkpoints, absent "individualized suspicion of wrongdoing," must be
suppressed because such checkpoints amount to pursuing general crime control
purposes in violation of the Fourth Amendment.27
After the decision in Edmond, Mack filed a motion for reconsideration, and
the trial court granted the motion.2" On reconsideration, the trial court found in
favor of Mack and ruled to suppress the evidence seized from Mack's vehicle at

19. Id.
20. Id.

1. [I]t is unlawful for any person to possess or have under his control a
controlled substance. 2. Any person who violates this section with respect
to any controlled substance except thirty-five grams or less of marijuana is
guilty of a class C felony. 3. Any person who violates this section with
respect to not more than thirty-five grams of marijuana is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 195.202 (2000).
21. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 708.
22. Id.
23. Id.

24. 936 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Mo. 1996) (holding that ruse drug checkpoints were
constitutionally permissible because they resulted in minimal intrusion on the motorists
and advanced a sufficiently important state interest).
25. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 708.
26. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
27. Id. at 47.
28. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 708.
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the ruse checkpoint.29 The State then filed an interlocutory appeal.3" Because of
the general interest and importance of the issue presented, the court of appeals
transferred the case directly to the Missouri Supreme Court.3
On appeal, the state contended that there was reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing when the officers stopped Mack at the checkpoint, and, thus, the
required "quantum of individualized suspicion," as required by Edmond, was
present. 2 Mack, on the other hand, argued that his actions did not provide the
police officers with the requisite amount of individualized suspicion and that the
purpose of the ruse drug checkpoint was to pursue general crime control, which
was prohibited by Edmond.33 As a result, he argued, by stopping him at the
checkpoint, the police violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.34
The Missouri Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, reversed the trial court's
decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.35 In an opinion by Chief
Justice Limbaugh, the Missouri Supreme Court found that the state had met its
burden of proof to show that the checkpoint stop did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because the requisite amount of individualized suspicion was
created in the use of the deceptive drug checkpoint.36
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution gurarantees the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.37 The underlying
purpose of the Fourth Amendment has been described as "safeguard[ing] the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government
officials."38 Furthermore, "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 709 (citing Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47).
33. Id. at 708 (citing Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 710.
36. Id.
37. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

38. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,377 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
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and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
' In 1967, the United States
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."39
Supreme Court declared that the protection promised by the Fourth Amendment
applies to any governmental search or seizure that interferes with a person's
reasonable expectation of privacy.4" To establish a constitutional violation,
therefore, a defendant must establish (1) an actual, subjective expectation of
privacy, (2) that society recognizes as being reasonable.4 1
The Fourth Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures by the government extends not only to traditional arrests but also to brief
investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of a traditional arrest.42
Whenever a police officer approaches an individual and restrains his freedom to
walk away, he has "seized" that person for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.4 3
Because the "balance between the public interest and the individual's
right to personal security," tilts in favor of a standard less than
probable cause in such cases, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the
officer's action is Supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that
criminal activity "may be afoot."4
Consequently, a search or seizure that falls short of a traditional arrest is
ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing.45
"Individualized suspicion" justifying the minimally intrusive Terry" stop is
present "where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be

39. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citing Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
40. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
41. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83,
96 (1998); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 210 (1979); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Terry, 392 U.S. at 9.
42. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 (The Fourth Amendment governs "'seizures' of the
person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for
crime-'arrests' in traditional terminology.").
43. Id.
44. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7
(1989)).
45. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (quoting Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997)).
46. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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afoot."47 The United States Supreme Court stated in 2001 that the "degree of
individualized suspicion required is a determination that a sufficiently high
probability of criminal conduct makes the intrusion on the individual's privacy
interest reasonable."4 The Court further stated that, although the Fourth
Amendment ordinarily requires probable cause, a lesser degree of suspicion
satisfies the Constitution when the balance of governmental and privacy interests
makes such a standard reasonable.49 Moreover, if the courts allowed stops for
the primary purpose of general crime-fighting without requiring individualized
suspicion, they would "in effect obliterate the rule requiring individualized
suspicion for anti-crime stops."5
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has declared that persons stopped for any
purpose at motorist checkpoints set up by government officials have been
"seized" under the Fourth Amendment.51 Nevertheless, in limited circumstances
involving checkpoints, courts have held that individualized or reasonable
suspicion may not be necessary to search and seize an automobile.52 A person's
expectation of privacy with respect to his automobile is significantly less than the
expectation of privacy a person may have at his home or office." This lesser
expectation derives not only from the fact that the area to be searched is
frequently in plain view, but also from the fact that automobiles, unlike homes,
are subjected to much broader governmental regulation and inspection
requirements.54 Thus, in limited circumstances, courts may allow checkpoint
stops without individualized suspicion as long as the stops are conducted for
narrow regulatory and safety purposes related to driving. 5

47.
48.
49.
(1981).
50.

Id. at 30.
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 113 (2001).
Id.; see Terry, 392 U.S. at 10-11; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46-47.

51. Mich. Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990) ("[A] Fourth

Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint."); Brower v.
County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs "when
there is a governmental termination of freedom ofmovement through means intentionally
applied."); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976) ("It is agreed that
checkpoint stops are 'seizures' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").

52. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455 (Court upheld a sobriety checkpoint aimed at
removing drunk drivers from the road); Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 561 (Court upheld
brief, suspicionless seizures of motorists at a fixed border patrol checkpoint designed to
intercept illegal aliens).
53. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-92 (1985).
54. Id.
55. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454-55.
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Whether a checkpoint stop is reasonable is determined by a balancing test
established in Brown v. Texas. 6 The test weighs the "gravity of the public
concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the
public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.""7 The
purpose in weighing these factors is to "assure that an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered
discretion of officers in the field.""8 Furthermore, in evaluating the legitimacy
of a stop, courts consider the totality of the circumstances, and, in some cases,
after doing so, factors that "by themselves [are] quite consistent with innocent
travel [may] collectively amount to reasonable suspicion."59
B. History of Checkpoints
The first major decision allowing checkpoints was United States v.
6 ° In that case, the United States Supreme Court found that
Martinez-Fuerte.
immigration checkpoints around the United States-Mexico border were
constitutional. 6 ' The Court stated that all cars may be stopped at a fixed
checkpoint and opined that the expectation of privacy in a vehicle was
significantly, less than what would be expected in one's residence. Furthermore,
the intrusion on the interests of motorists was minimal due to the procedures used
by the police in conducting the checkpoints.62 The Court also noted that the stops
furthered the general public interest in preventing the influx of illegal aliens, and,
therefore, the interference with Fourth Amendment freedoms was justified.63
On the other hand, in Delaware v. Prouse," the Court struck down
checkpoints as unconstitutional when individual patrolmen made discretionary
stops to ensure that drivers were properly licensed and their cars were properly
registered.6 The police making the stops in Prousehad neither probable cause
nor reasonable suspicion to believe that any particular car they stopped was being
driven in violation of the law. Furthermore, the police exercised unbridled
discretion in conducting the checkpoint.66 Although the Court found these stops
unconstitutional, the Court nevertheless suggested that it would probably be

56. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).

57. Id. at 50-51.
58. Id. at 51.

59. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989).
60. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
61. Id.at 561-62.

62. Id. at 567.
63. Id. at 562.
64. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).

65. Id. at 663.
66. Id. at 654.
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constitutionally permissible for the police to set up a checkpoint at which every
car is stopped to verify compliance with licensing and registration laws, because
this would not entail any police discretion.67
Following Prouse, this dictum essentially became the law when the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints in Michigan
Department of State Police v. Sitz.68 In Sitz, the police had set up a fixed
checkpoint on a highway and stopped all cars passing through the checkpoint.69
The Court found that sobriety checkpoints were constitutionally permissible due
to the significant problem of drunken driving in Michigan.7" The Court
determined that the slight burden the checkpoint imposed on law-abiding drivers
justified the slight infringement on their personal liberty.7 The Court opined
that such stops may be made of all drivers even though the police have no
particularized suspicion about any one driver.7 The logic in Sitz only applies,
however, when the police stop all cars passing through a checkpoint. There still
cannot be any discretion on the part of individual officers unless they have
particularized suspicion concerning an individual.73
In 2000, however, the United States Supreme Court's decision in City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond declared drug intervention checkpoints illegal.74 In
Edmond, the police set up a series of six checkpoint locations, at each of which
they stopped a predetermined number of vehicles.75 Although officers checked
each driver's registration and license, the primary purpose of the checkpoints
was to check for illegal drugs.76 To this end, the officers conducted a plain-view
exam of each stopped vehicle from the outside, and a drug-detection dog walked
around the outside of the vehicle.77 The Court noted that it had, in the past,
authorized suspicionless checkpoint stops under certain circumstances, but it had
never approved a checkpoint program "whose primary purpose was to detect
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing."" The checkpoint program in this
case, according to the Court, fell into this ordinary criminal wrongdoing class

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 663.
496 U.S. 444 (1990).
Id. at 447-48.
Id. at 455.
Id.
Id. at 454-55.
Id.
531 U.S. 32 (2000).
Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
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because its primary purpose was to detect illegal narcotics, and, thus, the Court
found that the checkpoint program violated the Fourth Amendment.79
In support of its decision, the Court stated that it feared that if the
checkpoints at issue were found constitutional, "there would be little check on
the ability of the authorities to construct [checkpoints] for almost any
conceivable law enforcement purpose."8 Moreover, "[w]ithout drawing the line
at [checkpoints] designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime control,
the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming
a routine part of American life." 81 Thus, the Court held that the stops in
Edmond, to the extent they were not accompanied by individualized suspicion
of wrongdoing, were unreasonable and, thus, violated the Fourth Amendment.82
Consequently, after Edmond, all drug checkpoints are prohibited, at least as
traditionally structured, unless "individualized suspicion" exists as to each
vehicle that is stopped and searched.
C. Ruse Drug Checkpoints
Recently, law enforcement officers in various states have begun to utilize
"ruse" drug checkpoints.83 Invariably, these checkpoints involve signs along a
highway informing travelers that there is a drug checkpoint ahead. If the driver
attempts to avoid the checkpoint by exiting, police pull the driver over at the ruse
checkpoint. Referring to a ruse checkpoint in Texas, one officer stated, "[W]e're
just using the signs [of a checkpoint ahead] to see who panics trying to avoid the
checkpoint. The key to this deal is they have to commit a traffic violation."84
While few cases have addressed the constitutionality of ruse drug
checkpoints, the Missouri Supreme Court addressed this very issue in State v.
Damask." Damask involved two consolidated cases addressing similar drug

79. Id. at 41-42.
80. Id. at 42.
81. Id.

82. Id. at 47.
83. See generally United States v. Flynn, 309 F.3d 736 (10th Cir. 2002)
(Oklahoma); United States v. Green, 275 F.3d 694 (8th Cir. 2001) (Missouri); United
States v. Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 1998) (Tennessee); United States v.
Klinginsmith,25 F.3d 1507 (10th Cir. 1994) (Kansas); State v. Ray, 764 N.E.2d 173 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2002) (Illinois).
84. Drug Sting Works off Drivers Making Panic Mistakes, ABILENE REPORTER-

NEWS, Oct. 30, 1998, availableat http://texnews.com/1998/texas/drug1030.html. Ron
Hobbs is chief deputy of Jefferson County, Texas.
85. 936 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1996). Note that State v. Damask was decided before
the United States Supreme Court's decision to ban drug checkpoints. See supranotes 7482 and accompanying text.
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checkpoint operations.8 6 Both of these checkpoint operations involved signs
placed along a highway advertising a drug checkpoint ahead. 7 Drivers who
wished to avoid the advertised checkpoint could take an earlier exit, but the
drivers then encountered the drug checkpoint that they had anticipated would be
at the next exit on the highway."8 In both cases, the exits that the police selected
for the real checkpoint were in remote areas that offered no services to
travelers.8 9 Further, the police stopped all vehicles who passed through the
exits.9"
The defendants in Damaskchallenged the constitutionality of the initial stop
of their vehicles at the ruse checkpoint, arguing it violated their Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.9 1
Responding to this argument, the court in Damasknoted that the deceptive drug
checkpoints at issue were modeled after successful checkpoint operations and
that the checkpoints were planned to increase the likelihood of such success.92
The court held that ruse drug checkpoints were constitutionally permissible
because they resulted in minimal intrusion on the motorists and they effectively
advanced a sufficiently important state interest.93
On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a contrary
conclusion in United States v. Huguenin,94 in which it decided that a drug/DUI
checkpoint ruse similar to the one in Damaskviolated the Fourth Amendment.95
The Sixth Circuit found that the primary purpose of the checkpoint was to detect
narcotics and the fact that the checkpoint also had a secondary purpose of
catching drunk drivers did not make it valid.96 The court further found that the
motorists in that case were taken by "surprise" because they were not stopped at
the designated location for the checkpoint, but rather they were stopped
elsewhere.97 Consequently, the court in Huguenin held that the checkpoint at

86. Id. at 567.
87. Id. at 568-69.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 570.
92. Id. at 573. These checkpoints were modeled after previous drug checkpoints
in Phelps County. Id. "Evidence showed that the checkpoint program in Phelps County
had resulted in the seizure of more than thirty 'loads' of contraband." Id.
93. Id. at 575.
94. 154 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 1998).
95. Id. at 563.
96. Id. at 555-56.
97. Id. at 556. "[W]hile checkpoints must stop motorists on a non-random and
neutral basis, in the present case the checkpoint was intentionally set up as a trap,
targeting motorists who left the Interstate and who thought they would avoid the highway
checkpoint for whatever reason." Id. at 561 (emphasis added).
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issue failed to create the kind of individualized suspicion required under the
Fourth Amendment.9" The court further noted that the checkpoint actually
caused greater Fourth Amendment concerns than the typical checkpoint because
its surreptitious nature resulted in unreasonable and unnecessary surprise to the
law-abiding motorist.99
0
On the other hand, in UnitedStates v. Brugal,"'
the Fourth Circuit held that
a driver's evasive behavior in exiting a highway to avoid an advertised drug
checkpoint did support a finding of reasonable suspicion.1"' In this case, the
Court noted that reasonableness was established by significant efforts to reduce
the legitimate reasons for taking the exit, including setting it up in an isolated
area where no services were offered. 2
More recently, in 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit addressed the constitutionality of ruse drug checkpoints in United States
v. Yousif."3 The court in Yousif held that a ruse drug checkpoint violated the
Fourth Amendment when its primary purpose was the interdiction of drug
trafficking. 4 In Yousif, the Missouri Highway Patrol had set up a ruse drug
checkpoint and placed signs along the highway that warned travelers that they
were approaching a drug checkpoint further down the highway. 5 The actual
checkpoint, however, was located on an exit ramp a short distance past the
signs."' In holding that this checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment, the
court stated that the mere fact that some vehicles took the exit after passing the
drug checkpoint signs did not create individualized suspicion of illegal activity
as to every driver who took the exit. 0 7 Indeed, the court stated that "while some
drivers may have wanted to avoid being caught for drug trafficking, many more
took the exit for wholly innocent reasons-such as wanting to avoid the
inconvenience and delay of being stopped or because it was part of their intended
route."' ' The court in Yousif also noted that "[g]eneral profiles that fit large
numbers of innocent people do not [alone] establish reasonable suspicion"' 9 and
that the defendant in the case never would have been stopped by the police but

98. Id. at 557.
99. Id. at 556.
100. 209 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 2000).
101. Id.at 361.
102. Id.
103. 308 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2002).
104. Id. at 823.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 827.
108. Id. at 827-28.
109. Id. at 828; see, e.g., United States v. Eustaquio, 198 F.3d 1068, 1071 (8th Cir.
1999).
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for the existence of the illegal checkpoint. 1 ° Moreover, according to the court,
because "there is nothing inherently unlawful or suspicious about a vehicle...
exiting the highway, it should not be the case that the placement of signs by the
police in front of the exit ramp transforms that facially innocent behavior into
grounds for suspecting criminal activity.""' Extending this logic further, the
court stated that reasonable suspicion cannot be manufactured by the police
themselves." 2 Because of this and the other reasons expressed by the court, the
court in Yousifheld that the initial stop and detention of the defendant's car at the
ruse drug checkpoint constituted an unlawful seizure under the Fourth
Amendment." 3
Notwithstanding these decisions, there have been very few cases to address
the constitutionality of ruse drug checkpoints, especially after Edmond. It is
clear, however, that there is a decided split of opinions among the courts that
have addressed this controversial issue.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Majority Opinion
In State v. Mack, the Missouri Supreme Court addressed whether a ruse
drug enforcement checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment of the United

States Constitution.'" The court began its analysis by recounting the facts and
holding of the United States Supreme Court in City ofIndianapolisv. Edmond."5
In Edmond, the Court found the drug checkpoints at issue unconstitutional
because they were used to pursue "primarily general crime control purposes" and
that "stops can only be justified by some quantum of individualized
The Missouri Supreme Court then framed the issue as
suspicion."' "6
whether the deceptive drug checkpoint scheme before it generated the necessary
quantum of individualized suspicion as required under Edmond."7 In
considering this issue, the court noted that it is reasonable to conclude that

110. Yousif,308 F.3d at 829.
111. Id.
112. Id; cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) ("A contrary

holding here would mean that a vague suspicion could be transformed into probable
cause for arrest by reason of ambiguous conduct which the arresting officers themselves
have provoked.").

113. Yousif,308 F.3d at 829.
114. State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 709 (Mo. 2002).
115. Id. at 708-09.
116. Id. at 708 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Id. at 709.
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drivers with drugs would "take the bait" of the deceptive drug checkpoint and
exit the highway to avoid being questioned at the next exit where the checkpoint
was advertised to be taking place." 8 The Mack majority also stated that it was
reasonable to conclude that the drivers taking the exit at issue had drugs because
there were no services offered at the exit and the checkpoint was conducted on
an evening during which there would otherwise have been little traffic on the exit
road." 9 Thus, the court concluded that the deceptive drug checkpoint at issue
was generally effective. 2 In addition, the court stated that, even if the deceptive
drug checkpoint scheme alone did not constitute individualized suspicion,
Mack's particular conduct when exiting the highway was sufficient to create
individualized suspicion.' 2 ' In support of this, the court noted that Mack
"suddenly veered off onto the off ramp" and "almost missed the turn," as if he
made the decision to exit only upon learning that a checkpoint was allegedly
ahead.'22 Because of this, and because the checkpoint itself was set up in such
a way as to create individualized suspicion, the court held that the stop of Mack's
vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment.'23
B. The Dissent
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Stith,joinedby two otherjudges, vehemently
opposed the majority's opinion and stated that the instant case fell within the
parameters of City ofIndianapolisv. Edmond.'24 The dissent first noted that the
main issue before the court was whether the procedures used to set up the
checkpoint created the kind of individualized suspicion required by Edmond,
when considered from an objective standpoint.'
The dissent then noted that
while Edmond requires individualized suspicion, the police in the instant case
were operating on group suspicion as evidenced by the fact that they pulled over
every driver that exited.'26 Next, the dissent stated that a court cannot approve
an unconstitutional seizure on the basis that it is an effective law enforcement
procedure.' 27 Furthermore, even if it could, the dissent argued that ruse

118. Id.
119. Id.

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 710.
123. Id.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

710-11 (Stith, J., dissenting).
714 (Stith, J., dissenting).
714-15 (Stith, J., dissenting).
715 (Stith, J., dissenting).
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checkpoints are not effective enough to distinguish them from other drug
checkpoints12 and that there are numerous valid reasons why law-abiding
citizens might exit before the advertised checkpoint.129 Finally, the dissent stated
that the police did not, in fact, stop Mack because he swerved, but rather because
he exited. 3 ° Judge Stith, therefore, concluded that the stop violated the Fourth
Amendment because the primary purpose of the stop was to pursue generalized
criminal activity, which had been declared unconstitutional in Edmond.'
V. COMMENT
In State v. Mack, the Missouri Supreme Court set a dangerous precedent
that, in effect, allows law enforcement authorities to sidestep the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Edmond banning all drug checkpoints that stop
vehicles without individualized suspicion. The holding inMack encourages law
enforcement authorities to develop situations that circumvent established law and
to take deceptive steps to attempt to create individualized suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing.
In Mack, the majority opinion listed several objective factors about the stop
of Mack's vehicle at the checkpoint at issue that satisfied the "quantum of
individualized suspicion" required under Edmond.'32 Included in the majority's
analysis was the fact that Mack swerved onto the exit after passing the signs
posted along the highway warning of a drug checkpoint ahead.'33 In addition,
the majority stated that it was reasonable to assume that criminals would "take
the bait"and that there were very few reasons why any motorist who was not
engaged in criminal activity would take that particular exit.3 The court argued
that all of this showed that the checkpoint was likely to be effective in catching
criminals, and, therefore, the court found the tactic acceptable. This sort of
argument, however, was directly rejected by the United States Supreme Court in
Sitz when it stated that the effectiveness of a checkpoint should not be taken into

128. Id. at 715-16 (Stith, J., dissenting).

The record does not support the

assumption that only those engaged in criminal activity would "take the bait" and exit the
highway in response to drug checkpoint signs posted along the highway. Id. at 715
(Stith, J., dissenting). "[O]f the 60 to 150 cars that left the highway, 46 drivers were

talked to by police and 25 'or more' were detained so that a search could be made." Id.
at 715 n.3. Although the officer's numbers were inexact, "he recalled some five drugrelated arrests, including defendant's and four arrests for misdemeanor drug offenses."
Id.
129. Id. at 716-20 (Stith, J., dissenting); see infra text accompanying notes 143-47.

130. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 720 (Stith, J., dissenting).
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. (Stith, J., dissenting).
Id. at 709-10.
Id. at 710.
Id. at 709.
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account when determining the constitutionality of the procedure as a whole.135
Consequently, even though the state attempted to list several objective
factors to justify the stop, its case necessarily boils down to one single argument:
that the act of avoiding a checkpoint, by itself, necessarily creates a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.
The majority ofjurisdictions that have addressed the more general issue of
flight from police confrontation have held that the mere act of avoiding
confrontation does not create reasonable and articulable suspicion.136 For
example, in State v. Talbot,' the Utah Court of Appeals specifically addressed
whether avoiding a roadblock amounted to reasonable suspicion that the
occupants of the vehicle in question were involved in criminal activity.'38 The
state contended that when a person obviously avoids confrontation with the
police, that fact alone is sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot. 39 The court rejected this argument and stated that flight alone
is insufficient to create a reasonable suspicion. The court further stated that its
position was:
[I]n keeping with the United States Supreme Court's position that a
person need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may
decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way. He
may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective

135. Mich. Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453-54 (1990) (The courts
must not consider the relative effectiveness of a chosen path of law enforcement activity
in determining its constitutional propriety. So long as the technique employed is
reasonable, the decision whether to use it or some other approach, whether more or less
effective, is left in the hands of law enforcement officials.).
136. See, e.g., Hinton v. United States, 424 F.2d 876, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (flight
is not a "reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances to make its import less
ambiguous"); People v. Thomas, 660 P.2d 1272, 1276 (Colo. 1983) ("[A]n effort to
avoid police contact, by itself, is insufficient to support a stop."); In re D.J., 532 A.2d
138, 141 (D.C. 1987) (Defendant "merely attempted to walk away, behavior indicative.
simply of a desire not to talk to police. No adverse inference may be drawn from such
a desire."); People v. Fox, 421 N.E.2d 1082, 1086 (III. App. Ct. 1981) ("[T]he mere fact
that the vehicle drove away at the approach of a squad car does not serve as a justifiable
basis for conducting a Terry stop."); People v. Shabaz, 378 N.W.2d 451, 460 (Mich.
1985) (flight "does not alone supply the particularized, reasoned, articulable basis to
conclude that criminal activity is afoot"). But see Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125
(2000) (unprovoked flight inside an area of known criminal activity provided police with
reasonable suspicion); United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 669 (6th Cir. 1977) (flight
"may furnish sufficient ground for a limited investigative stop").
137. 792 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
138. Id. at 492.
139. Id. at 493.
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grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not,
without more, furnish those grounds. 4 '
Consequently, the Talbot court stated that although their decision might be
at odds with a few checkpoint cases, it was very much in keeping with the
majority of cases addressing the more general issue of avoiding a confrontation
with the police. 4 ' If a person may choose to avoid or ignore an officer when
approached on the street, there is no reason why he or she should not be able to
avoid an equally, if not more, intrusive confrontation at a roadblock. 4 '
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has also addressed the issue. In
Commonwealth v. Scavello,'43 the defendant challenged a traffic stop on the
basis that he was only stopped because he had made a legal u-turn to avoid a
sobriety checkpoint. The court held that avoidance of the checkpoint was, by
itself, an insufficient justification for the traffic stop and noted that "there is no
requirement that a driver go through a [checkpoint]."' 44

140. Id. at 494 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added)).
141. Id. at 495.
142. Id. at 494. Moreover, legal scholars have suggested that a person may
lawfully choose to avoid or to not cooperate at a roadblock. See, e.g, Lance J. Rodgers,
The Drunk-Driving Roadblock: Random Seizure or Minimal Intrusion?, 21 CRIM. L.
BULL. 197, 207-08 (May-June 1985); William P. Weiner & Michael D. McCulloch,
Sobriety Checkpoints in Michigan: Balancing Sobriety and Propriety Under the Fourth
Amendment, 4 COOLEY L. REv. 247, 268 n.108 (1987).
143. 734 A.2d 386 (Pa. 1999).
144. Id. at 388; see also Howard v. Voshell, 621 A.2d 804, 807 (Del. 1992) (lawful
u-turn 1000 feet from a sobriety checkpoint did not constitute reasonable and articulable
suspicion for stop); United States v. Lester, 148 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605 (D. Md. 2001) (uturn 1500 feet away from a temporary gate check did not give rise to reasonable,
articulable suspicion to justify the stop); State v. D'Angelo, 605 A.2d 68, 71-72 (Me.
1992) (Glassman, J., dissenting) (The mere presence of a roadblock does not eliminate
the requirement that there be an objectively reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to
justify the stop of a vehicle not passing through a checkpoint. "Anything less would
countenance roving stops, a practice declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in
Delaware v. Prouse."); State v. Bryson, 755 N.E.2d 964, 969 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001)
("[L]egal turn within sight of a roadblock does not give a police officer a reasonable basis
to suspect that the driver is involved in criminal wrongdoing."). But see United States
v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 360-61 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 961 (2000) (a driver's
evasive behavior in exiting the highway to avoid a ruse drug checkpoint supports a
finding of reasonable suspicion); Tims v. State, 760 S.W.2d 78, 79 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988)
(act of defendant of running through a roadblock gave police a reasonable suspicion to
detain him); Snyder v. State, 538 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (a driver's
attempt to avoid a roadblock does raise reasonable suspicion that the driver may be
committing a crime).
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Furthermore, after Mack was decided, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided United States v. Yousif, in which it declared a ruse drug checkpoint
unconstitutional "insofar as its primary purpose was the interdiction of drug
trafficking."' 45 The Yousifcourt, thus, came to a completely opposite conclusion
as the court in Mack.'46 The court in Yousifdirectly undercut the Mack court's
reasoning when it stated that the mere fact that some vehicles took the exit after
passing the drug checkpoint signs did not create individualized suspicion of
illegal activity as to every driver.'47
In Yousif, the court further noted that the defendant never would have been
stopped by the police but for the existence of the illegal checkpoint. 48 Likewise,
in Mack, the driver of the vehicle did not commit any traffic violations, so it
seems likely he would not have been stopped but for the existence of the
checkpoint. Moreover, the court in Yousif stated "there is nothing inherently
unlawful or suspicious about a vehicle... exiting the highway, [so] it should not
be the case that the placement of signs by the police in front of the exit ramp
transforms that facially innocent behavior into grounds for suspecting criminal
activity."' 49 In addition, Yousif stated that reasonable suspicion cannot be
manufactured by the police themselves. Nevertheless, this is exactly what the
police did in Mack. 5 Therefore, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
individualized suspicion is not created simply by avoiding a checkpoint, which
is a decision in direct opposition to Mack.
Thus, whether it was in the context of a general roadblock,'' a sobriety
checkpoint," or a ruse drug checkpoint,' these jurisdictions directly addressed
the issue that confronted the Missouri Supreme Court in Mack: whether
avoiding a checkpoint is, in itself, sufficient justification for a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. The court in Mack simply hedged the issue of whether
avoiding the roadblock, by itself, was enough to constitute reasonable suspicion
for the stop of Mack's vehicle. The majority stated that it was reasonable to
conclude that drivers with drugs would exit to avoid the checkpoint. Even if it
is reasonable to make this conclusion, however, this does not automatically
amount to individualized suspicion to stop every vehicle that exits. This

145. United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820, 827 (8th Cir. 2002).
146. Id. at 829 n.4.
147. Id. at 827.
148. Id. at 829.
149. Id.
150. Id.; cf Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) ("A contrary
holding here would mean that a vague suspicion could be transformed into probable
cause for arrest by reason of ambiguous conduct which the arresting officers themselves
have provoked.").
151. State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
152. Com. v. Scavello, 734 A.2d 386 (Pa. 1999).
153. United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2002).
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reasoning by the majority comes dangerously close to suggesting that law
enforcement may stop all vehicles at a drug checkpoint because there may be a
criminal among some of the vehicles. If this were the case, the purpose of the
checkpoints involved would be for general crime control, and that was
specifically prohibited under Edmond.
The majority opinion further stated that "even if the deceptive drug
checkpoint scheme did not alone constitute 'individualized suspicion,' [the]
defendant's particular conduct in exiting at the checkpoint must also be
considered."' 4 This argument is also flawed, however, because every driver
who exited at the checkpoint was stopped, not just those drivers who "swerved"
or otherwise committed suspicious acts.155 Hence, according to the majority's
approach, a suspicion arose as to all exiting vehicles, "based solely on the fact
that they had exited the highway after, presumably, seeing the drug checkpoint
sign." '56 Because the Supreme Court has held that someone has the right to
avoid talking to the police at all, 157 it logically follows that a person should also
have the right to avoid a checkpoint if one so chooses. The reasoning used by
the Mack court, therefore, is incorrect.
Finally, the majority opinion in Mack suggests that few law-abiding
motorists would take the exit at issue because the checkpoint was set up in an
isolated area. 58 Even if this were relevant, however, the court is making an
erroneous assumption because, as other courts have noted, there are many valid
reasons why a law-abiding citizen may wish to avoid a checkpoint. As the
dissenting opinion noted, "[t]he reasons for desiring not to encounter a
checkpoint could range from a desire to get to one's home or other area
destination, to a desire to avoid having to deal with a delay in one's travel plans,
to a fear of the police due to prior unpleasant encounters with other officers in
the past."' 59 Or the driver may simply wish to avoid "the unusual process of
being stopped on the Interstate highway."' 60 Likewise, inMichiganDepartment
ofState Policev. Sitz,' 6 the United States Supreme Court noted "those who have
found-by reason of prejudice or misfortune-that encounters with the police

154. State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 709 (Mo. 2002).
dissenting) (the record indicates that 60 to 150 cars exited
155. Id. at 714 (Stith, J.,
during the drug checkpoint's operation and all of them were stopped).
156. Id. (Stith, J., dissenting).
157. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,498 (1983) (a person need not answer any
questions the police ask; in fact, the person "may decline to listen to the questions at all
and may go on his way"); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1979) (a Texas statute
could not require persons to identify themselves in the absence of reasonable suspicion).
158. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 709.
159. Id. at 716 (Stith, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 717 (Stith, J., dissenting).
161. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
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may become adversarial or unpleasant without good cause will have grounds for
worrying at any stop designed to elicit signs of suspicious behavior."' 62
Furthermore, "[b]eing stopped by the police is distressing even when it should
63
not be terrifying, and what begins mildly may by happenstance turn severe."'
It is an erroneous assumption, therefore, that only criminals, and not law-abiding
citizens, will "take the bait" and exit the highway to avoid a deceptive drug
checkpoint.
Consequently, the police in Mack "created" individualized suspicion in
order to stop motorists for general crime control purposes. If police in Missouri
are allowed to do this in Missouri, where would it stop? As the dissent noted:
There is something fundamentally unsettling and counter-intuitive
about labeling as suspicious a person's conduct in avoiding the state's
own unconstitutional conduct... [because] the drug checkpoint that
the police made drivers believe was one mile ahead on the highway
itself would have been unconstitutional under Edmond.'64
Nevertheless, the Mack court allowed legal activity to be used as a basis for
interfering with the fundamental right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. Today, the court's decision affects only drug checkpoints. Tomorrow,
however, the court's decision could affect much more than we would like to
imagine.
VI. CONCLUSION
The holding in State v. Mack impermissibly expands the power of law
enforcement authorities to create checkpoints that would otherwise have been
unlawful simply by setting up "ruse" checkpoints. After Mack, Missouri police
have the power to enforce a checkpoint for any general crime control purpose,
so long as they create circumstances which allegedly lead to individualized
suspicion. Police can accomplish this simply by posting a sign along the
highway that informs motorists of a checkpoint ahead, and stopping any motorist
who attempts to exit before he or she reaches the advertised checkpoint. By
allowing this kind of activity, the court in Mack allows police to create
individualized suspicion where there originally is none. In the process, the court
in Mack is completely ignoring the conclusions of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Edmond, which was to limit police power in the absence of
reasonable suspicion.

162. Id. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 717 (Stith, J., dissenting).
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Furthermore, Mack is a disturbing case because its holding does not
establish any real boundaries for law enforcement officers in Missouri. As long
as law enforcement officers follow "proper" procedures in developing ruse
checkpoints, they can conceivably develop a checkpoint for any purpose.
Although crime control and prevention is a top priority for many citizens of
Missouri, the price is too high when it means Missourians have to give up their
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
KATHRYN L. HOWARD
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